Previous accounts of hedges assume that they cause language to become vague or fuzzy (Lakoff, 1973) ; however, hedges can actually sharpen numerical concepts by giving explicit information about approximation especially where bare numbers appear misleadingly round or precise. They can also tell hearers about the direction of approximation (greater or less than). This article provides a first empirical account of interactions between hedging and rounding in numerical expressions. We demonstrate that hedges occur more commonly with round numbers than with non-round ones. However, we also provide evidence from user studies that in the absence of hedges, readers interpret round numbers as approximations and non-round ones as precise; and that placing a hedge before a round number has no effect on its interpretation, whereas placing it before a non-round number shifts people's interpretations from precise towards approximate. We attempt to explain this conundrum.
Introduction
We present a study of the interaction between numerical hedges (approximators) such as 'about', 'more than' and 'smaller than', and rounding (approximating or estimating) in numerical expressions. 1 This research was carried out as part of the NumGen project, 2 one aim of which was to investigate how numerical quantity descriptions vary in English. We collected a corpus of sets of texts where the same numerical facts were mentioned repeatedly, giving a range of alternative expressions. By 'numerical expressions', we mean phrases that contain numbers expressed in words (such as 'ten' or 'dozen') or digits. The corpus includes examples of cardinals, ordinals, dates, decimals, multiples, fractions, percentages and ratios. Numerical expressions contain other constituents such as the modifiers that we call 'numerical hedges'.
To illustrate, consider the following phrases where numerical expressions are shown in italics: The above phrases demonstrate all combinations of hedging and roundness. In (1), the round proportion '80 percent' is hedged with 'about'; in (2) the round proportion '30 per cent' is unhedged; in (3) the non-round percentage '97%' is hedged with 'above'; and in (4), the sum '£40,921,250' is neither hedged nor round 3 .
Hedged ¬Hedged Rounded HR ¬HR ¬Rounded H¬R ¬H¬R Table 1 : Matrix of hedged, unhedged, round and non-round combinations
Occurrence hypotheses
Our first question is whether roundness and hedging co-occur in numerical expressions. To our knowledge this issue has not been the focus of any previous empirical study; however, in a wide-ranging analysis of conversational transcripts, Rowland (1995) has observed that hedges and round numbers tend to go together. To investigate this suggestion systematically, we counted occurrences in our corpus of the four possible combinations shown in table 1: HR (hedged and round), H¬R (hedged and non-round), ¬HR (unhedged and round), and ¬H¬R (unhedged and non-round). To confirm Rowland's observation, the outcome should be as follows:
• HR vs. H¬R: Hedging occurs more often with round numbers than with non-round ones
• HR vs. ¬HR: Roundness occurs more often with hedged numbers than with unhedged ones
Interpretation hypotheses
Our second question is how hedging and roundness influence the interpretation of numerical expressions. Here our starting point is Krifka's speculation that round scalar quantities (e.g., '1,000 kilometers') are interpreted as approximations -the so-called RN/RI or Round Number Round Interpretation theory (Krifka, 2002) . Although plausible as an intuition, Krifka's theory has not yet been supported by empirical evidence. The second study in this paper tests his theory, not just for scalar quantities but for other numerical expressions such as proportions, and also investigates how interpretations are influenced by hedges. The dependent variable in this study is whether people judge the number given in an expression as precise or approximate, and we test four claims based on Krifka's theory, one relating to each quadrant in table 1:
• ¬HR: Where round numbers are unhedged, readers tend to interpret them as approximations
• ¬H¬R: Where non-round numbers are unhedged, readers tend to interpret them as being precise
• HR: Where round numbers are hedged, readers tend to interpret them as being more approximate than without a hedge
• H¬R: Where non-round numbers are hedged, readers tend to interpret them as being less precise than without a hedge
Objectives
We have focussed on two suggestions from the literature, one by Rowland (1995) in which we took a writer's perspective (and hence investigated by corpus analysis), the other by Krifka (2002) in which we took a reader's perspective (and hence investigated by a study obtaining human judgements). These suggestions, both relating to the four combinations in table 1, conflict in an interesting way. If Krifka is correct in thinking that round numbers receive approximate interpretations, why do writers hedge round numbers more than non-round? If the purpose of hedging is to signal that the number given is an approximation, one would expect hedges to be used more often when the number is non-round (and thus apparently precise): for an expression like 'about 80 percent' (example 1) the hedge should be redundant, since the round number '80 percent' will be interpreted as approximate in any case. Thus if it turns out that Rowland and Krifka are both right, we are left with an interesting conundrum to resolve. The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we look more closely at the concepts of hedging and roundness, and clarify in particular the binary distinction between round and non-round that we have used in the empirical studies. Section 3 gives further background on earlier discussions in the literature, including a variety of explanations that have been proposed for the use of hedges and round numbers. Sections 4 and 5 describe our empirical studies, the first testing the hypotheses presented earlier based on Rowland's observations, and the second testing the hypotheses based on Krifka's theory. Finally, in sections 6 and 7, we reconsider the interaction between hedging and roundness in the light of the results, and conclude.
Definitions

Numerical hedges
When applied to numbers, hedges such as 'more than', 'less than', 'about' and 'exactly' indicate an equality or inequality between the value given in a text (from now on we will call this the given value, or V G ) and some actual value (V A ), e.g., 'around 100' where V G = 100 and V A = 97.56; or 'exactly 100' where V G = V A = 100. In most everyday contexts, of course, values are so rarely exact that when people say 'exactly', some error is perfectly acceptable for practical purposes; we would not expect 'exactly 3 kilometers' to be correct to the nearest millimeter in the context of the distance to the nearest Post Office. Indeed V A , the actual value, is often not known with any great precision and may not be known at all, as in the case of predictions (e.g., 'the temperature tomorrow will rise to around 18 degrees C'), where V A can only be estimated. In scientific contexts, on the other hand, authors and readers are more aware of errors (e.g., in readings from scientific instruments), and are normally required to quote some estimation of error alongside their measurements, e.g., '12±2nm'. For hedges representing inequality between V A and V G , we assume that V G is reasonably close in value to V A and serves as an approximation of V A -we would not for instance include cases like 'I am over 18 years old' spoken by a 60-year-old defending his/her right to vote.
Hedges can be elaborated in various ways that lie outside the scope of this paper. For instance, a hedge can indicate the size of the difference between V G and V A (e.g., 'substantially higher/lower than £100', 'a little over/under £100'), or whether the difference is surprising ('dramatically lower than').
Some hedges give two values in order to define a range, e.g., 'between £99 and £101'.
Semantics of numerical hedges
We focus, then, on one facet of the meaning of numerical hedges, the arithmetical relationship between V G and V A , ignoring the other facets just mentioned (degree of difference, surprise, etc.). With this restriction, we can enumerate the possible meanings of hedges as follows:
We classify hedge semantics into three major groups. The first, labelled 'Non-directional approximation', has two subgroups: (a) 'point' e.g., 'approximately two', means that V A can either be greater or less than V G ; and (b) 'bounded range' has two given numbers specifying lower and upper bounds of V A , e.g., 'between one and three', or one given value with plus or minus limits, e.g., '2±1'.
The second major group, 'directional approximation', includes comparative quantifiers (e.g., 'more than' and 'less than'), superlative quantifiers (e.g., 'at least' and 'at most', and similar formulations such as 'two or more'). These we define, in line with Geurts et al. (2010) , as meaning mathematically < or > (comparatives) and ≤ or ≥ (superlatives) 4 . In addition to comparatives and superlatives we distinguish another type of directional hedge that means 'approaching a given value', e.g., 'almost' or 'nearly'. The direction of these hedges is often implicit in the textual context, e.g., the headline 'Claude Monet water lily painting fetches record of nearly £41m', or it may be given by verbs that express rising and falling, often combined with prepositions, e.g., 'fell to' in 'The temperature fell to almost zero' and 'rose to' in 'The share price rose to nearly ten dollars'. We have expressed the meanings 'less than but approaching a given value' by the mathematical symbol and 'greater than but approaching a given value' as . Boundaries between the subgroups 'approaching a given value from above/below' and 'comparatively greater/less than' may not always be clearly defined, e.g., compare 'The temperature fell to almost zero' with 'The temperature fell to little more than zero.' Finally, the third major group comprises hedges whose meaning is equality, e.g., 'Exactly a hundred.'
Pragmatics of numerical hedges
Pragmatically, a speaker's choice between directional or non-directional hedges depends on whether she wants to emphasise that the actual value is large, or small, or neither: compare 'The concert tickets cost more than £80' (large) with 'The concert tickets cost less than a tenner' (small) and 'The concert tickets cost around £15' (neutral). Additional modifiers like 'substantially' and 'dramatically' can focus even greater emphasis on largeness or smallness; other subtle nuances of meaning such as speed can be injected through choice of directional verbs, e.g., 'The temperature plummeted to nearly zero'.
If we classify hedges from a pragmatic viewpoint, we obtain groupings that overlap substantially with the semantic classification in the last section, with emphasis on largeness and smallness obtained through hedges which semantically express directional approximation. One might expect hedges in the 'greater than' subgroup to emphasise largeness, and hedges in the 'less than' group to emphasise smallness, and for comparatives and superlatives this seems clearly the case. Interestingly, however, the hedges meaning 'approaching from above/below' exchange places: 'The temperature plummeted to nearly zero', classified semantically in the 'greater than' group, seems to emphasise the smallness of the actual value, while 'The Monet painting fetched nearly £41m' (semantically 'less than') emphasises its largeness. The full pragmatic classification is as follows:
• Emphasis on largeness
• Emphasis on exactness
The first group of hedges pragmatically emphasises largeness: 'more than £80' (actual value £80.50), 'nearly £80' (actual value £79.50), 'at least £80' (actual value £80.50). The second group emphasises smallness: 'less than a tenner' (actual value £9.50), 'knocked down to almost a tenner' (actual value £10.50), 'a tenner or less' (actual value £9.50). The third group is neutral: 'around a tenner' (actual value £9.50 or £10.50), 'between £10 and £12' (actual value £10.99). The final group emphasises exactness 'exactly £10' (actual value £10.00) over brevity, see Krifka (2002) . Quirk et al. (1985) place numerical hedges in the syntactic class of adverbial intensifiers 5 as follows:
Syntax of numerical hedges
• they modify cardinal numerals, e.g., "Almost two million UK nationals have settled abroad over the past decade." (Independent, May 2008)
• they modify dates, e.g., "The drawing, completed around 1880, . . . " (New York Sun, June 2008)
• they modify decimals, e.g.,"With a radius close to 1.5R ⊕ , the planet is the closest Earth twin to date." (Astronomy and Astrophysics, April 2007)
• they modify predeterminer fractions, e.g., "But that is a good sign, because red dwarfs are less than half the size of the sun, and cooler.' (Independent, April 2007) and noun phrase fractions, e.g., 'They pinpointed a stretch of rogue DNA that is carried by more than a third of the population . . . " (Daily Mail, May 2008)
• they modify predeterminer multiples, e.g., "This is nearly double the Government's target." (Daily Mail, June 2008)
• they modify ordinals, e.g., "
We counted approximately the first thousand votes." p.450 in Quirk et al. (1985) • they modify percentages, e.g., "Theory predicts that the small planet should be about 50% wider than the Earth and have a rocky surface." (New Scientist, April 2007)
• they modify ratios, e.g., "The proportion of pupils awarded A grades also rose again with more than one in four gaining the top marks." (Independent, August 2008)
• they modify 'larger units', e.g., "The acceleration fell to less than ten metres per second." (p.450)
We found examples of all the above in our corpus except hedged ordinals. Not all hedges are premodifiers; some are postmodifiers (e.g., 'two or more', 'two people or fewer', '3oz of flour or less'), as Crystal (1988) has pointed out.
Roundness
Intuitively roundness is a matter of degree, so that for example the numbers 2222, 2220, 2200 and 2000 lie on a scale of increasing roundness. However, at least in the early stages of investigation, it is convenient to simplify by drawing a binary distinction between round and non-round; such a distinction is often used in the literature (e.g., in Krifka's RN/RI theory), and is particularly convenient in designing empirical studies. Of course any binary distinction requires the arbitrary drawing of a line, but until we have a better understanding of roundness, any continuous metric will require arbitrary decisions too. According to Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round number), 'round numbers' are integers ending in zero in the decimal numbering system, i.e. the set 10, 20, 30, 40, ... and can also be multiples of 5; or in binary, the series of round numbers would be 10, 100, 110, 1000, etc. (i.e., 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . ) . Rounding is defined as the process of reducing the number of significant figures (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rounding). There is also a notion of minimising the distance to the nearest whole number of significant figures, so 12 would be rounded down to 10 for one significant figure, while 19 would be rounded up to 20.
For numbers up to 99, one approach would be to define round numbers as those ending in zeros, but above 100, this rule becomes counter-intuitive as too many numbers would be considered round. Another strategy would be to link the number of trailing zeros to the number of powers of ten, i.e., one zero for numbers from 1 to 99, two zeros from 100 to 999, three zeros from 1,000 to 9,999, four zeros from 10,000 to 99,999 and so on. But this would give too few round numbers. Another approach would be to say that whole numbers are round if the number of trailing zeros is greater than or equal to the total number of digits so that 20 would be round but not 25, and 845,000 would be round but not 840,500, but this would not account for decimals such as 0.005. Common fractions and ratios are round numbers, that is, half, one-third, two-thirds, one-quarter, and three-quarters, and their ratio equivalents, 1:2, 1:3, 2:3, 1:4, and 3:4, and in addition 1:50, 1:100 and 1:1000.
After considering these various possibilities, we based our rounding decision on work by Jansen and Pollmann (2001) , who sought a rule that best predicted peaks in a graph of numbers against frequencies (e.g., numbers like 100 occur much more frequently in texts than their neighbours 98, 99, 101, 102 etc.). The rule first defines a set of 'favourite numbers' that are often used as units (e.g., in currency systems), then defines a round number as a product K * U where U is a favoured unit and K is a relatively small integer (they suggest integers in the range 1..20). Favourite numbers are defined in relation to a base, i.e., 10 unless in specialised contexts, as follows: a number is a favourite number U if it can be expressed as M * 10 N , where N is any integer, and M is either 1, or 0.5, or 0.25, or 2. Thus favourite numbers are powers of ten pure and simple, or powers of ten that have been halved, quartered or doubled. Counting upwards from 1, then, we would obtain 1 (= 1 * 10 0 ), 2 (= 2 * 10 0 ), 2.5 (= 0.25 * 10 1 ), 5 (= 0.5 * 10 1 ), 10 (= 1 * 10 1 ), 20 (= 2 * 10 1 ), and so forth.
Although this criterion has the advantage of being general and empirically based, it is rather inclusive for our purposes -for instance, 38 counts as round since it can be expressed as 19*2 where 2 is a favourite number, and so does 42.5 which can be expressed as 17*2.5. We have therefore followed the same approach, but imposed a more severe restriction on favourite numbers by allowing only M = 1 and M = 0.5. With this revision, the round numbers (counting from 1) are 1-20, then 25, 30, 35, . . . , 100, then 110, 120, 130, . . . , 200, then 250, 300, 350, . . . , 1000, and so on. In this way we bring Jansen and Pollmann's rule closer to the intuitive ideas on roundness found for example in the Wikipedia article cited above.
Previous Work
Research on hedges in English dates back to the 1970s when Lakoff (1973) described them as words or phrases outside the scope of formal truthconditional logic; he proposed that fuzzy logic is required to represent their meaning. Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982) divided hedges into two types, approximators and shields, where approximators hedge content within a proposition and shields hedge an entire proposition. Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982) In (5) the proposition is definite and the speaker (all else being equal) believes it is true, in (6) the speaker also believes the proposition is true, whilst in (7) the speaker is less sure about the truth of the proposition. The difference between (5) and (6) (according to Prince et al.) is that (6) is vaguer owing to the numerical hedge 'about'. Dubois (1987) wrote that a numerical hedge is 'a means of diminishing precision', echoing Lakoff's idea that hedges introduce fuzziness.
Corpus Studies
Many previous corpus studies of numerical hedges have analysed spoken discourse (Dubois, 1987; Rowland, 1995; Prince, Frader, and Bosk, 1982) . Dubois (1987) studied numerical hedges in transcripts of oral scientific presentations. She found that hedges are widely used by scientists when talking about their results, and that the most frequent hedge in her corpus was 'about'. In fact, all of her most frequent numerical hedges also occur in our written corpus ('about', 'approximately', 'some' and 'around'); there were only four that do not occur in ours: 'somewhere around', 'somewhere in the order of', 'plus or minus', 'not much longer than', 'middle', and 'a bit'. Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982) developed a typology of hedges from a corpus of spoken physician-physician dialogues. They identified a subclass of approximators (mentioned above) which they termed rounders; this subclass seems to correspond to numerical hedges. Their corpus contained 492 hedges of which only 24 (5%) were rounders, so data on numerical hedges were sparse. The majority of their hedges (51%) were what they called plausibility shields, in which physicians weakened their commitment to the truth of statements by inserting phrases like 'I think that' and 'I had to believe that'. Rowland (1995) analysed transcripts of conversations between a mathematics tutor (himself) and schoolchildren. He did not quantify frequencies of the different hedges he found, but instead qualitatively described the types of hedges and discussed the uses to which they were put by the tutor and the pupils. He classified the hedges using Prince et al's (1982) typology, and discussed how rounders are used by the pupils not only as approximators but also as plausibility shields, to protect themselves from the humiliation of giving the wrong answer. Thus he demonstrated that Prince et al.'s types may not always be distinct. Some corpus studies on written discourse mention numerical hedges (Hyland, 1996; Lewin, 2005) ; these tend to focus on scientific writing. Hyland found that numerical hedges played a 'very insignificant role' in his corpus of molecular biology research articles; presumably he found very few of them. Lewin asked authors to read examples of their own scientific articles, identifying phrases where they had 'toned down' their claims and explaining why; then she asked other readers to perform the same task on the same papers. Phrases with approximator hedges were sometimes recognised by both groups as toning down the claims, and sometimes not. No actual figures were given; this was probably because the corpus was small, with only 13 articles overall, of which only three were used in the study. There was no investigation of the degree of precision in the numbers themselves.
In summary, although none of these studies provides clear evidence on the relationship between numerical hedges and roundness, they do contain interesting observations, such as Rowland's passing reference to 'the fact that round numbers are normally chosen with numerical Rounders' (Rowland 1995, p. 3470) , which suggested to us that the two phenomena might cooccur. Dubois (1987) also noted that many numerical expressions in her corpus were rounded, either explicitly through hedges, or implicitly through 'acceptable, unacknowledged imprecision' (p. 530).
Why round and hedge numbers?
Many researchers have speculated about why people use numerical hedges and round numbers (Dubois, 1987; Crystal, 1988; Krifka, 2002; Prince, Frader, and Bosk, 1982; Lewin, 2005; Rowland, 1995; Sanford and Moxey, 2003) ; their proposals are summarised below.
Round numbers reduce cognitive load
Evidence from psychology clearly demonstrates that round numbers are easier to recall and recognise than non-round ones. Mason, Healy, and Marmie's (1996) experiments showed that roundness is the key factor in determining people's ability to remember numbers: that is, subjects remember a round number such as 11,000 better than a non-round one such as 11,635, even when they have previously performed some task with the number, such as writing it down, or generating it by adding two other numbers together. Mason et al. call this 'the rounding effect' and believe that it occurs because non-round numbers require more mental processing. Krifka, Rowland and Dubois (2002; 1995; 1987) also argue that it is more difficult for hearers to mentally process non-round numbers.
Hedges make rounding or precision explicit
The most obvious reason for numerical hedges is to make the level of precision explicit to the hearer: 'the number that I am about to give you is approximate', or 'the number I am about to give you is precise to the best of my knowledge'. As we said in the Introduction, circumstances might mean that even when a speaker says 'exactly' the number is rarely exact because it may not be possible to provide all the significant figures, or it may simply be exact enough for the context.
Round numbers are used to predict or estimate Rowland (1995) mentions that people use round numbers when they make estimations or predictions. As we discussed in the Introduction, predictions have limited accuracy.
Hedges frame a speaker's viewpoint Hedges may change the impact of a message, or 'frame' it positively or negatively; advertisers express proportions with hedges in a manner that superficially enhances their product -e.g., 'over 95% fat free' rather than 'less than 5% fat' (Sanford and Moxey, 2003) . See also section 2.1.2 where we discussed pragmatics of numerical hedges.
Hedges signal that more precise numbers will follow later in a document Dubois (1987) suggested a reason for hedging which, while true in some discourses, does not seem to apply universally. She suggested that numerical hedges were used in scientific talks for 'background information with less precise numbers indicating less importance, foreground numbers on the other hand are non-hedged to signal greater importance and often used as pointers to more precise numbers to follow' (Dubois, 1987) . In our written corpus, this was certainly not always the case. Whilst the scientific text in section 2.2 complies with the theory (since it has a foreground unhedged number in the title followed by a more precise number later in the text), other articles in our corpus do not; hedged numbers are given prominence and are followed by more precise numbers -e.g., in a newspaper article, a foreground, hedged number begins the first sentence 'More than a quarter of papers were marked A' . . . , and in the fifth paragraph, a more precise number follows '25.9 per cent of A-level papers were awarded an A-grade' (Williams and Power, 2009) .
Hedges safeguard or save face for the speaker Most researchers agree that in common with other types of hedges, numerical hedges are used in situations where they save the face of the speaker (Lewin, 2005; Prince, Frader, and Bosk, 1982) , or protect the speaker from humiliation if the number she gives is wrong (Rowland, 1995) . Dubois extends this idea to suggest that speakers hedge numbers to express their reservations about their own or other researchers' findings (Dubois, 1987) e.g., when talking about very recent, sparse results with possible methodological flaws.
Hedging round numbers shows politeness and/or conforms to Grice's maxims Prince, Frader, and Bosk (1982) point out that hedging numbers is a means of conforming to Grice's conversational maxims (Grice, 1975) . To offer too many significant figures would violate the maxim of quantity unless the speaker were making a particular point (Krifka, 2002; Crystal, 1988) , and to offer too extreme a rounding without a hedge would flout the maxim of quality. Many authors cite Brown and Levinson's work on politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987) as a similar reason for hedging.
Corpus study of the occurrence of hedging and rounding
Our first empirical study tested our occurrence hypotheses that hedging occurs more often with round numbers than non-round ones and that roundness occurs more often with hedged numbers than unhedged ones. It was performed by counting the frequencies of numerical expressions in the NumGen corpus. Before describing the study in detail, it will be useful to provide some background information on how the corpus was collected and annotated, and the range of numerical expressions and hedges that it contains. (see table 2) , with a total of 2648 sentences, 54584 words, 1887 numerical expressions, and 404 numerical hedges. For each topic there is a set of numerical facts mentioned repeatedly in the relevant articles. One such topic group consists of nineteen articles about the discovery of a new planet in the orbit of Gliese 3, all published in May 2007, along with an original article from the journal Astronomy and Astrophysics, articles from the popular science magazines Nature, Scientific American, New Scientist, and Science, and articles from eleven newspapers and three Internet news sites.
Corpus Collection
We searched for newspaper articles whose main topic was a numerical quantity, preferably articles that referred to a scientific journal source article which was also included in the corpus. The ten topics, the 110 articles collected, and their sources, are given in table 2. The table shows that the corpus consists mainly of newspaper articles (99 articles), but also four science journal articles, three press releases, and four science magazine articles.
Phrase Millions (approx.) 'about ten' 9.5 'more than ten' 7.1 'over ten' 5.9 'within ten' 5.6 'at least ten' 3.6 'up to ten' 2.7 'less than ten' 2.0 
Corpus Analysis
The corpus was split automatically into sentences, then sentence boundaries were checked and corrected manually. Numerical expressions, hedges, units, and given values were annotated manually using spreadsheet computer tools for searching, sorting, and subtotalling the data. We wrote a computer programme to extract the given values, apply rounding decision rules, and automatically annotate whether numbers were round or non-round. We wrote another computer program to convert the annotated corpus to XML format 6 . Table 4 lists all numerical hedge tokens found in our corpus and the mathematical forms with which they occur (cardinal, ordinal, etc.) . The most frequent hedges, in order, were 'more than' (79 instances), 'between' (38 instances) and 'about' (36 instances). In fact, 'more than' made up 20% of all hedges, almost double the frequency of any other hedge. The second most frequent, 'about', was the most common in Dubois' corpus of science talks (Dubois, 1987) .
Overall corpus characteristics
To confirm that our hedge frequencies are typical (at least for written numbers), we also performed Google (www.google.co.uk) searches for hedged phrases occurring with the word 'ten' (see table 3), e.g., 'more than ten'. The two most frequent hedges in the Google search coincide with Dubois's and ours. Notably missing from the highest frequencies in Google were 'almost', 'between', 'nearly' and 'under', all of which had high frequencies in our corpus.
Regarding the mathematical forms with which hedges occur, fractions and multiples had the highest proportions of hedges (48% and 36% respectively), followed by cardinals (28%) and percentages (21%). Ratios, decimals and dates were hedged rarely, and ordinals not at all (although, of course, a Google search yields some examples such as 'I asked him for about the sixth time', in fact 0.3 million which is relatively few).
In table 5 we classify numerical hedges semantically according to the relation between V A and V G as discussed in section 2.1. When we considered the context of hedges that mean 'approaching V G from above' and 'approaching V G from below' ('almost', 'close to', 'nearer to', 'nearly' and 'to hit') we discovered to our surprise that all instances in the corpus had the latter meaning. Of course, there are plenty of naturally occurring examples with the 'approaching from above' meaning, e.g., 'US rates slashed to nearly zero' (headline from BBC news online (news.bbc.co.uk/), 16 December 2008).
Overall in table 5, three groups predominate: (i) non-directional, (ii) directional greater than and (iii) directional less than. These three are all about the same size with each comprising roughly 1/3 of all hedges. The fourth group, equality, has only 2 members. In fact, 'equals' hedges seem to be rare within English as a whole according to Google searches on 'exactly ten' which yielded only 83,000 hits and 'precisely ten' which yielded even fewer (31,500).
When we consider pragmatic groupings as discussed in section 2.1, the composition is quite different, see table 6. Now the group emphasising largeness dominates; this is a significant finding in itself since hedges that emphasise largeness account for almost half of all hedges in the corpus. It seems that when people choose to emphasise size through numerical hedges, they prefer to emphasise largeness over smallness 7 . The corpus study clearly supported our two claims based on Rowland's observation (Rowland, 1995) , i.e.:
• Hedging occurred more often with round numbers than with non-round ones.
• Rounding occurred more often with hedged numbers than with nonhedged ones.
User study on the interpretation of round and non-round numbers and hedges
Our second empirical study tested our interpretation hypotheses that where round numbers are unhedged, readers tend to interpret them as approximations; where non-round numbers are unhedged, readers tend to interpret them as precise; where round numbers are hedged, readers tend to interpret them as more approximate than without a hedge; and where non-round numbers are hedged, readers tend to interpret them as less precise than without a hedge. We aimed not only to validate Krifka's RN/RI (round number, round interpretation) theory for whole number, scalar values, but the Pollyanna hypothesis in psychology that people tend to produce positive, rather than negative utterances (Boucher and Osgood, 1969) .
also to extend it to decimals, percentages and fractions. Furthermore, we wanted to find out whether interpretations would be changed by adding a hedge meaning 'approximately' before round and non-round numbers.
To recruit participants, we sent a questionnaire to three ACL (Association for Computational Linguistics) special interest groups: SIGGEN (Special Interest Group on Natural Language Generation), SIGSEM (Special Interest Group on Semantics) and SIGDIAL (Special Interest Group on Discourse and Dialogue) and to academics at the Open University Centre for Language and Communication. Participants were invited to use their common sense and judgement to decide whether numerical facts presented in 24 English sentences were precise or approximate.
Materials
Twelve sentences describing numerical facts were chosen from the NumGen corpus: four with facts expressed as cardinals or decimals, four with percentages, and four with fractions. The numerical expression in each sentence was then manipulated to obtain a second sentence, so that we had twelve pairs. Within each pair we varied only one factor, either (i) the precision of the numerical fact, or (ii) the presence of a numerical hedge. The linguistic context for each numerical phrase was kept constant.
Obviously semantic context influences whether a fact is interpreted as approximate or precise. We tried to randomise the contexts of the sentences as much as possible by choosing them from different articles on different topics. We also varied the size of the number by using values ranging from 2.3 to 48 billion.
Manipulating precision
In nine of the twelve sentences, the original numerical expressions were manipulated by replacing round V G values by non-round values of similar magnitude, and vice versa. The following examples show the alternative values inside square brackets, using the order [round / non-round] Jansen and Pollman's (2001) , as explained in section 2.2: a cardinal number is classified as round if it can be expressed as a product K * U , where U is either an integer 10 N for N = 1, 2, 3 . . ., or such a value divided by two, and K is an integer in the range 1..20. For proportions (numbers between 0 and 1), the rule is the same except that we use negative values of N . For (8) this criterion classifies '5' as round and '5.03' as non-round; for (9) it classifies '30 per cent' as round and '31 per cent' as non-round. Since the rule does not cover fractions, we use a special criterion according to which only fractions with denominators of 2, 3 or 4 are round: thus in (10), 'half' is classified as round and nine-fourteenths as non-round (we chose 'nine-fourteenths' since it was the only non-round fraction in our corpus).
Manipulating hedging
For the remaining three sentences, the numerical expression (one cardinal fact, one percentage and one decimal) was manipulated by adding the hedge 'around', so allowing a comparison between hedged and unhedged expressions with the remainer of the sentence held constant.
In all, the experimental materials consisted of 24 sentences, 9 round/nonround pairs and 3 hedged/non-hedged pairs, as in table 8.
Questionnaire
Our questionnaire was implemented on the Internet survey site at surveymonkey.com. The twelve sentence pairs were distributed over six pages, with Figure 1 : Questionnaire, page 1 one sentence from each pair on the first three pages and the other sentence on the following three pages, see figure 1. The first sentence from each pair was chosen randomly so that round, non-round, hedged and unhedged sentences were distributed evenly, with six non-round, three round, one hedged, and two unhedged sentences on the first three pages, and three non-round, six round, two hedged, and one unhedged sentence on the following three pages.
Four radio buttons were arranged in a row adjacent to each sentence, and labelled on the scale Very Approximate, Approximate, Precise, Very Precise. Any one of the four buttons could be clicked to select it. We deliberately did not include a central button between Approximate and Precise since we wanted to force participants to classify the numerical expression either as one or the other.
If participants noticed that they were reading similar sentences twice, we assumed they would not remember the numerical quantity of the pre-vious sentence, nor the judgement that they had given. However, to make absolutely sure that people were not being primed by seeing a round number first, or a non-round number first, we produced a second version of the questionnaire with the sentence order reversed. This meant that half of the participants always saw one version of each sentence first, whilst the remaining participants always saw the other version of the sentence first (and vice versa).
We used SurveyMonkey settings that did not allow initial answers to be altered once a page had been submitted. Participants were able to go back and see their earlier answers because, even though there was no 'Back' button on the questionnaire pages, we could not prevent people from using the 'Back' button on their Web browsers. From the participants' point of view, it seemed as though they could change their earlier answers by clicking on alternative choices which SurveyMonkey appeared to accept, but in fact only the choices that they had submitted first were recorded.
Method
Subjects were sent a link to the questionnaire in an e-mail and invited to judge whether numerical facts in sentences were approximate or precise, as above. The instructions were as follows: WELCOME! There are 6 sets of questions in this survey. Please answer as many as you can. It should take about 10-15 minutes, it is anonymous, and you can exit at any point.
INSTRUCTIONS
We invite you to use your common sense and judgment to decide whether numerical facts are precise (exact) or approximate (vague). For example, "10%" in the sentence: "My friend says that since she has been on a diet she has lost 10% of her body weight." You will be shown four options: Very Approximate, Approximate, Precise, and Very Precise. Please select one option for each sentence.
Each question page contained four questions in random order (see figure 1 ) so page 1 always contained 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d but in different orders (1d, 1c, 1a, 1b, for example). The paired sentences were situated so that the first occurred on question pages 1-3 and the second on pages 3-6. One group of participants received the pages in the order 1-6, while the other group received them in the reverse order, 6-1. Thus our results could be calculated pairwise, within subjects, using each participant's answers to both questions of a pair, or independently, between subjects, by considering only answers to the first sentence of each pair that a participant saw.
After completing the questions, participants saw a 'Thank you' screen with a text box to type in comments. Following the survey, answers were transferred from SurveyMonkey to a statistics package where results were calculated.
Results
The questionnaires were completed by 105 subjects, 63 with the original page ordering, and 42 with page ordering reversed. To avoid any priming effect within pairs, we performed our main analysis using responses to the first sentence of each pair only, the second sentence serving as a check 8 . Table 9 shows results for the nine sentences comparing round vs. nonround V G values, including a 2x4 Pearson's Chi-Square testing the null hypothesis of no association between roundness (with two levels) and judgements of precision (with four levels ranging from 'very approximate' to 'very precise'). Table 10 shows the analogous results for the three sentences comparing hedged vs. unhedged expressions.
The columns in tables 9 and 10 present the following: (i) the numerical phrase (Phrase) as it appeared in the sentence that subjects saw; (ii) whether the number in the phrase is round (R) according to our decision rule (y/n); (iii) the group (g) to which participants belonged; (iv) number of subjects in the relevant group (n); (v) the number of people who gave 'very approximate' judgements (Very Appr), (vi) the number of 'approximate' judgements (Appr), (vii) the number of 'precise' judgements (Prec), (viii) the number of 'very precise' judgements (Very Prec), (ix) the value of Pearson's Chi-Square (χ 2 ), and (x) the 2-sided asymptotic significance of this value (rightmost column).
Pairs of numerical phrases are shown on consecutive rows with lines between pairs. For each phrase, the group of participants from whom the judgements were recorded is shown in the same row; for example, for the phrase '30 per cent', 5 people judged it as 'very approximate', 44 people as 'approximate', 12 people as 'precise' and 2 people as 'very precise'. Note that the values of n always differ within a pair (for '30 per cent' n=63, for '31 per cent' n=42) since, as already mentioned, the table only considers responses to whichever sentence (within the pair) the subject saw first. Table 10 : Comparing precision judgements on hedged vs. not hedged numbers (according to our roundness decision algorithm) were judged as more approximate than the non-round numbers, that is, a greater proportion of people judged round number phrases to be approximate or very approximate than the corresponding non-round phrases (e.g., for the phrase '30 per cent', 49 out of 63, or 78% judged it approximate, whereas only 9 out of 42 people, or 21% judged the corresponding non-round phrase '31 per cent' to be approximate). Similarly, a greater proportion judged non-round number phrases to be precise than the corresponding round number phrases (e.g., for the phrase '31 per cent', 33 out of 42, or 79% judged it precise, whereas only 14 out of 63 people, or 22% judged the corresponding round phrase '30 per cent' to be precise). More than 50% of participants gave 'precise' and 'very precise' judgements on two round numbers, 5 per cent and £40,000,000 (52% and 83%, respectively); however, even greater proportions gave the same judgements to the two corresponding non-round numbers. So overall, we can say that people do perceive round numbers as being more approximate than non-round numbers, and that this applies to cardinals, decimals, percentages and fractions.
Discussion
Round numbers are interpreted as approximate (depending on context)
Do people interpret round numbers as approximations (as in Krifka's RN/RI theory)? The answer to this question is slightly less clear-cut. We can analyse it better if we order the numerical phrases by the degree of agreement on 'approximate' (i.e., the proportion of people who chose 'very approximate' and 'approximate') or the degree of agreement on 'precise' (i.e., the proportion of people who chose 'very precise' or 'precise'), and view tham in table 11 with those that received more than 50% of 'approximate' judgements in the left-hand column and those that received more than 50% of 'precise' judgements on the right. This table shows all numerical phrases from the round vs. non-round sentence pairs. From table 11, it is immediately clear that all common fractions (a half, a third and three-quarters) are interpreted as approximations. Thus there is evidence supporting our hypotheses that common fractions are round and interpreted as approximate.
A result that surprised us was that 40,000,000, a round number with many trailing zeros, was viewed as precise rather than approximate: i.e., 83% of the participants that judged it chose 'precise' or 'very precise'. There is a plausible explanation for this, however. If we study the semantic context of the number in the sentence (11) that participants saw, the sentence does not provide enough information to tell whether the given number, V G , is the amount of the winning bid or the total amount that the buyer paid including fees. If participants assumed that it meant the winning bid, then their world knowledge that auction bids are normally round numbers would lead them Table 11 : Majority judgements on all round and non-round phrases to expect 40,000,000 to be precise rather than approximate:
11. 'The most important (and the largest) of Monet's Waterlilies ever sold made an astonishing £40,000,000 at Christies in London last nighta record price for the artist and, in the art market's main currency of dollars, a record for any Impressionist picture.'
In fact, another account of the same auction from The Guardian newspaper tells us that the bids increased 'in £500,000 leaps', and it is reasonable to suppose that anyone with knowledge of such auctions would expect a round number of millions to be the precise amount offered by the bidder. Therefore, through our random method of choosing experimental sentences, we fortuitously discovered a semantic context where round numbers are interpreted as precise! One participant commented that it is rare to find 40 million written completely in digits in a newspaper. It is true that '40 million' was the wording in the original sentence, but we changed 'million' to six zeros when we manipulated the roundness of the number because we wanted to maintain consistency in expressing all cardinals, decimals and percentages as digits (the fractions in our study were all expressed in words). In future work it might be worthwhile to investigate whether there is any difference in interpretation when certain numbers are expressed in words, or in a mixture of words and digits, as opposed to digits alone.
Another round number that people judged precise is five; both '5' and '5 per cent' were borderline with only 55% of people judging '5' as approximate and even fewer (48%) in the case of '5 percent' (i.e., 52% judged it to be precise). It is not clear why some participants interpreted '5' in sentence (8) (p. 19) as precise; perhaps since the source was a scientific article they assumed that scientists would give precise figures. In (12) the context of '5 per cent' is that of a prediction, i.e., predicted growth of the economy, so we would have expected most people to view it as 'approximate' or 'very approximate'; we cannot explain why 52% judged it as 'precise' or 'very precise': 12. 'In the latest indication that the economy is stalling, the employers' group has lowered its growth expectations to 5 per cent in 2009.'
Apart from the exceptions 40,000,000 and 5, all other round numbers were interpreted as approximate, providing evidence in support our hypothesis. However, we would now modify it to say 'round numbers are normally interpreted as approximate but there are certain special contexts where they are interpreted as precise'.
Non-round numbers are interpreted as precise
Do people interpret non-round numbers as precise (the converse of Krifka's RN/RI theory)? From table 11, it is clear that non-round decimals (5.03 and 2.3 per cent), non-round cardinals (275,912 and £40,921,250) , and nonround percentages (67%, 31 per cent and 2.3 per cent) are interpreted as precise. There is one exception: the fraction 'three-fourteenths' is borderline with 54% of subjects judging it approximate, i.e., choosing 'approximate' or 'very approximate'. This phrase appeared to the participants in sentence (13):
13. 'A separate survey by YouGov last year, found that three-fourteenths of Britons were considering emigrating.'
Apart from this exception, all other non-round numbers, including the fraction 'nine-fourteenths', appear in the 'precise' column of table 11, which provides strong evidence in support of our hypothesis that non-round numbers are interpreted as precise.
Hedging has no effect on round numbers
Do people interpret a round number as more approximate when it is hedged? Table 10 shows results from the study on hedged/unhedged sentences. These provide some evidence that when a number is round (e.g., 'half'), there is little difference in judgments between the hedged and unhedged versions, so that the hedge made no difference in this single case. One or two participants commented that they interpreted all the sentences in a truth-conditional logic sense rather than in an everyday language sense: that is, they only selected 'Approximate' options when the hedge 'around' was present. Perhaps this was to be expected since many participants were logicians. However, since only one or two people did this, their answers did not affect the overall results.
Hedging has an effect on non-round numbers except in certain contexts
Do people interpret a non-round number as more approximate when it is hedged? See table 10 again. The answer is 'yes' in the case of '97 per cent' where the hedge had a significant impact on people's precision judgments. However, £48,000,000,000 produced a very different result. Although this number is indeed non-round according to our strict version of Jansen and Pollmann's roundness decision algorithm (Jansen and Pollmann, 2001) , it was interpreted as approximate by a greater proportion of participants whether hedged or not, so the hedge made no significant difference (71% unhedged vs. 83% hedged). Sentence (14) provides a possible explanation: it shows that the number was used in a prediction context, which ought to lead people to interpret it as an approximation even though is is nonround. So it is not surprising that a greater proportion of people judged it 'approximate' (71-83%), nor that, like 'half' above, the hedge had no effect:
14. 'Public borrowing will balloon to £48,000,000,000, a figure which would almost certainly break the Government's "fiscal rules".' (Independent,
From these results, we have some evidence that when a number is nonround and does not occur in a special context such as a prediction, then the hedge 'around' will cause people to shift their judgements towards approximation.
Conclusion
We have examined two observations in the literature concerning round numbers and their relationship to hedging. The first (Rowland, 1995) is that roundness and hedging co-occur -i.e., that roundness increases the probability of hedging, and hedging increases the probability of roundness. Our corpus study tested this claim by gathering frequency data for all four combinations of roundness and hedging (HR, H¬R, ¬HR ¬H¬R); the χ 2 test for association between the two factors was highly significant, with frequencies higher than expected in the quadrants HR and ¬H¬R, and lower than expected in the others. Rowland's observation is thus strongly supported by the evidence.
The second claim that we have examined is Krifka's RN/RI theory (Krifka, 2002) , according to which round numbers tend to receive an approximate interpretation. Our user study tested this theory by soliciting judgements of approximation vs. precision for a set of sentence pairs, with the numerical values in each pair controlled so that one was round and the other non-round. The results unequivocally supported Krifka's theory: in every case, the rounder number was judged more approximate, and in most cases the number classified as round by our decision rule was judged (on average) approximate, and the number classified as non-round was judged precise.
To complete the parallel with the first study, we also presented some sentence pairs in which the numerical value was held constant, but hedged by 'around' in one sentence and unhedged in the other. We found that the hedge was effective in pushing judgements towards 'approximate' only when the unhedged expression was interpreted as precise; for a round number ('half'), or one interpreted as approximate ('£48,000,000,000'), the presence of the hedge had no significant impact.
We are left therefore with a puzzle. If the main purpose of hedging is to signal approximation, then why do writers tend to hedge round rather than non-round numbers, given that round numbers are judged approximate in any case (Krifka's theory, confirmed here), and that modifying a round number with a hedge has no significant impact? To give a useful signal of approximation, hedges should instead modify non-round numbers, to correct an erroneous impression that they are precise -for instance, the expression 'around 97%' in our user study if the actual value was 97.2%. One might argue that round numbers are hedged in order to reinforce the message that the given value is an approximation, perhaps as an extra safeguard against making an undesired commitment. However, the safeguard appears not to work (our results show that hedging a round number leaves the interpretation unchanged), so the explanation implies that the phenomenon is due to incompetence -a failure by speakers/writers to anticipate the reactions of hearers/readers. Of course this will happen now and again, but why should it be so general? One would prefer to find an explanation in which hedged round numbers served some clear communicative purpose.
We think that a clue can be found by considering again the frequencies of different categories of hedge. Our corpus study suggests that most hedges are directional (around two thirds of all hedges in the corpus): they mean either 'more than' or 'less than'. If most hedges are indeed interpreted directionally, we have an interesting explanation of why they should be used in association with round numbers: paradoxically, their role is not to blur the interpretation, but to make it more precise. Thus if '30%', a unhedged round number, is interpreted to mean some unspecified range around 30%, perhaps 25-35%, the addition of the hedge 'more than' serves to sharpen this interpretation by reducing the range to 30-35%.
This idea combines well with one of the other explanations of hedges found in the literature (see section 3.2): hedges frame a speaker's viewpoint. Sharpening the interpretation of a round number by a directional hedge often serves to achieve the emphasis required by the speaker's argument. To cite again the example from Sanford and Moxey (2003) , an advertiser is likely to prefer 'over 95% fat free' to the non-directional approximation '95% fat free' -and also to 'less than 100% fat free' which follows the wrong direction, slipping away from the ideal rather than rising towards it. To pursue the role of hedges in framing an argument lies beyond the scope of this paper, but our results strongly suggest that this type of explanation is needed, flatly contradicting the traditional view of hedges as a means of introducing fuzziness.
